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Abstract: 
  
Purpose: The main aim of this article is to spread awareness regarding the scale and dynamics 
of the development of particular sectors of the financial market and financial turnovers, which 
threaten the stability of the economy.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: To achieve that aim, the following analyses were conducted. 
A comparative analysis of current and historical data of the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) and the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) in terms of the number of assets allocated 
in selected sectors of financial markets as well as daily turnover. A content analysis for 
occurrences confirming growing financial imbalances and frequently occurring in the recent 
years deep crashes on key financial markets which are a threat to the stability of the global 
financial economy. Simultaneously, one aspect pointed out was the instance of the growing 
concentration of assets among individual entities and countries.     
Findings: The current position of the global economy is far from stable. It is a result of the 
uncontrolled explosion of development of financial markets and virtually generated profits 
which, by having been transferred to the world of the real economy, caused detachment of 
prices from their economic foundation in the recent decades which, in turn, contributed to the 
global economy's sensitivity to shocks as well as created extremely violent and deep crises with 
increased frequency.    
Practical Implications: Financial markets pose significant risks regarding a lack of control 
over the financier's world and threats to the global economy's financial stability and future 
civilization development rate. 
Originality/value: More and more capital on global markets significantly decreased its cost 
and increased acceptance of investment risk and underestimation, leading to its extremization 
– risk-taking phenomenon. It prompts even more debt, lowers business entities' vigilance, 
demotivates saving, reforms, and rationalizes actions among governments, banks, businesses, 
and citizens. It discourages share issuing and encourages increasing debt to finance business 
development – this can lead to the destruction of company values. Moreover, it reduces the 
power of economic policy. 
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1. Introduction to Financial Markets’ Wealth 
 
In the times of globalization of financial markets, their incredible financial wealth, 
and development of IT technology is important to realize the scale of threats for the 
stability of financial markets, businesses, countries, and the very functioning of the 
global economy as a result of the growing daily flow of capital. According to the 
official data, the amount of capital located on global financial markets currently 
reaches 1 quadrillion USD (1015) however, it is common knowledge that this amount 
is higher. The world of financial markets is connected to organized crime and the 
unwillingness of some parties to reveal the capital source or paying taxes. According 
to the data gathered by BIS which has been, over the years, conducting analyses of 
selected parts of global financial markets and the WFE, which aggregates global data 
from public stock markets, the total amount of assets in main parts of global financial 
markets corresponds to at least 11 times the global GDP, i.e., 11 years of work 
performed by 7.6 billion of people (2018, World Bank, 2019a) (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The value of selected parts of global financial markets compared to the 
value of the annual global GDP, GDP of the USA and Poland (USD tn)  
Source: BIS, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d, WFE, 2019, World Bank, 2019a. 
 
Without a doubt, no institution, group of entities, or country is as powerful as global 
financiers meaning the group of financial entities managing hundreds of trillions of 
USD invested in financial assets, thus controlling the direction in which investment is 
led globally and being able to destabilize the financial situation of markets, currency 
exchange, national economies, the global economy in a short period of time which 
was confirmed by the financial crisis of 2008 and coronavirus outbreak at the 
beginning of 2020. Financial markets are wealthy enough to influence the politics of 
countries in order to set legal solutions that are in favor of certain investors. This is 
confirmed by the amount of daily turnover on global financial markets, which exceeds 
the majority of countries' annual GDP several dozen or even several hundred times 
(Figure 2). Daily turnover on derivative markets, currency markets, and stock markets 
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Figure 2. Average daily turnover in selected sectors of global financial markets (USD 
tn in the period indicated in brackets)  
Source: BIS, 2019a, 2019b, 2019d BIS, WFE, 2019. 
 
 It should not come as a surprise to anyone that the changes happening on specific 
markets and, in turn, exchange rates, especially on the same day, are not necessarily a 
result of economic, political, psychological, or speculative factors but are a change of 
previous investment strategy or a notion of single financial institutions. We need to 
learn to live with those as they will be happening more often along with the growing 
wealth of global financiers, increasing daily turnover on financial markets, and 
accepted level of investment risk.   
 
This is the result of changes in the last decades in operations of financial markets 
connected with changes in macroprudential regulations and increasingly lower 
investment profits relying on interest rates, which not only encourage, but even forced 
to take bigger investment risk in order to gain the planned profits (Rajan, 2005; Adrian 
and Shin, 2009; Gambacorta, 2009; Farhi and Tirole, 2009a) and additionally cause 
the classic moral hazard problem (Altunbas, Gambacorta, Marques and Ibanez, 2010). 
Observed decade by decade increasingly lower interest rates globally caused 
significant changes in the tendency of economic entities (including financial 
institutions) to take the risk, their perception of risk, level of risk in an investment 
portfolio, pricing of assets, conditions and cost of new capital (Borio and Zhu, 2008).  
 
Undoubtedly, transition into the world of negative interest rates will intensify the 
above phenomena. That is why more and more economists are in favor of the policy 
called leaning against the wind, i.e., for maintaining interest rates on a higher level 
than it would stem from economic analyses in order to lower the tendency of economic 
entities to take risks (Mishkin, 2011; White, 2006; Boivin, Lane and Meh, 2010; 
Cecchetti et al., 2000; Borio and Lowe, 2002; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2000; Farhi 
and Tirole, 2009b) and also for the quicker restoring of the interest rates to their 
previous or even higher level to discourage or to prevent the risk-taking (Agur and 
Demertzis, 2010; Redo, 2013). 
 
2. Examples of Steep Changes in the Pricing of Financial Values  
 
One of the most recent examples of this is the steep decrease unexplained by analytics 
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when it lost 10.5% its value in a matter of one hour (Figure 3). It is worth reminding 
that in the first half of December 2017, Bitcoin was priced at 20 thousand USD.  
 
Figure 3. Steep decrease of the Bitcoin rate on September 24th, 2019 (against USD) 
and the Bitcoin value against US Dollar in the years 2013-2019 (on the small chart) 
Source: Coinmarketcap.com. 
 
A month earlier (on August 12th, 2019), the publication of results of presidential 
primaries in Argentina, where the current president received the lowest number of 
votes, caused a strong enough outflow of capital from the Buenos Aires stock 
exchange that the Merval index noted a 38% drop on a single day and peso lost 1/3 of 
its value compared to USD (from 45 to 60 USD) (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Steep decrease in the value of Argentinian ARS towards USD (the left chart) 
and Merval stock index on August 12th, 2019 (the right chart) 
Source: Xe.com and investing.com. 
 
 Due to their smaller size and the shallowness of their financial market, smaller and 
weaker countries are at risk because of the abrupt capital; however, it must be noted 
that bigger economies with well-developed financial markets must not feel safe. 
Financial institutions nowadays manage such significant financial assets that they can 
threaten the stability of major financial centers, international currencies, and, as a 
result, economies of the countries involved.  
 
 This is proven by the steep increase in the Swiss franc's value on “black” Thursday of 
January 15th, 2015 – the event so well remembered not only by those whose 
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mortgages were denominated in the Swiss franc. That is when the Swiss National 
Bank, after 4 years, stopped defending the currency from appreciation. As a result of 
CHF’s release, the currency’s position was strengthened against other currencies – of 
around 17% to USD (from 1.02 to 0.85 CHF) and EUR (from 1.20 to 0.99 CHF) 
(Figure 5). On that day, the Swiss franc increased its value in Poland from 3.545 to 
4.342 (i.e., by 22.5%).   
 
Figure 5. Steep appreciation of CHF towards USD (the left chart) and EUR (the right 




The mortgage installments of mortgages taken in CHF (which were popular not only 
in Poland at the time) increased on that day by 1/5 and, what was even more severe, 
the remaining amount of a given mortgage increased by 1/5 as well. In practice, it 
often meant an increased mortgage by tens or even hundreds of thousands of PLN. 
Even a day before the steep appreciation of CHF, the mortgage of 100 thousand PLN 
could have been paid ahead of the scheduled payment with the amount of 354.5 
thousand PLN, whereas the day after the event, 434.2 thousand PLN (almost 80 
thousand PLN more) was needed to settle the commitment.   
 
 Another, even better example of lack of resistance towards the outflow of capital 
among not only strong but also big countries is the capital outflow in the United 
Kingdom, which happened on June 24th, 2016, after partial results of the Brexit 
referendum with a slight majority of pro-Brexit votes were released. As a result, GBP's 
rate lost 9% in value towards USD, i.e., it dropped on one day from 0.67 to 0.73 for 1 
USD (Figure 6). 
 
It must be noted that a famous financier George Soros contributed to the steep 
depreciation of GBP almost 3 decades ago (in the second half of September 1992), 
which supposedly earned him over a billion USD in just a matter of days. The GBP 
rate lost over the course of 2 weeks in 1/5 towards USD, and between September and 
November of 1992, it decreased in value towards USD by 33% (from 0.50 to 0.66 
GBP for 1 USD (Figure 7). 
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 Nowadays, financial markets and individual financial institutions have incomparably 
higher capital and can, without too much effort and in a short period of time, lead to 
a market crash or their overestimation and creation of speculative bubbles and, as a 
result of their burst to financial destabilization of banks, businesses, countries and the 
entire global economy. The capital that has been accumulated since the 1980s at a 
growing speed and in a much more aggressive way in the world of virtual financial 
markets led to the accumulation of so much of that capital that the presence of a new 
investment opportunity, trend, or the need for a particular type of investment now 
leads to much faster creation of the speculative bubble.  
 
Confirmation for that can be found in the unprecedented increase of Bitcoin’s value 
in the years 2013-2017 up to the level of almost 20 thousand USD or in the sevenfold 
increase of gold’s price (from 256 USD per ounce in 2001 to 1900 USD in 2012), or 
the appreciation of CHF to USD by almost half (by 45%) around the time of the 
financial crisis in 2008 (from over 1.3 CHF for 1 USD at the beginning of 2006 to a 
little over 0.7 CHF for USD in 2011 which in the autumn of 2011 led SNB to intervene 
in the Swiss franc’s exchange rate over the course of 4 years, which prevented its 
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excessive appreciation in a situation of a significant increase in interest in investing 
capital in CHF) – Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Gold’s price increase up to 2012 (in USD per ounce; the left chart) and 
CHF’s appreciation against USD in the years 2005-2011 (the right chart) 
Source: Fxtop.com and goldprice.org, 2019. 
 
A result of the growing interest in the Swiss franc was the emergence of another 
significant financial instability: the almost elevenfold increase in reserve assets of the 
Swiss National Bank in almost a decade – up to USD 811bn at the end of 2017 (see 
Figure 9), which amounts to almost 120% of Switzerland’s GDP. 
 
Figure 9. Increased level of Swiss reserve assets (USD bn). 
 
Source: Self-reported data on the basis of World Bank, 2019b. 
 
As a result, Switzerland became one of the main owners of reserve assets in the world 
– both nominally (4th place) and about GDP (3rd place) – see Table 1 – along with a 
full spectrum of global financial ties and threats coming from those (Redo, 
Siemiątkowski, 2017). In comparison, the USA’s reserve assets were at 2.2% of the 
country’s GDP at the end of 2018 and in the United Kingdom at 6.1% of GDP (World 
Bank, 2019a, 2019b). 
 
3. Concentration of Assets in the Hands of Single Entities  
 
Over the course of a few decades, the accumulation of reserve assets as an effect of 
the increasing export inflows resulting from globalization and liberalization of global 
trade, growing consumption, better access to loans, growing inflow of foreign 
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investment capital (especially in the dynamically developing emerging economies), 
multiplied to unimaginable size as a result of the development explosion of financial 
markets in the last quarter of a century, forced to fiercer competition, more active 
search of higher return rates and accepting a higher level of investment risk, of which 
main aim was to strengthen the external solvency of economies, their stabilization, 
and increased credibility, led to the high concentration of huge capital resources in 
selected types of assets and currencies in the hands of a small number of countries.  
 
These could be regarded as sources of potential speculative bubbles and a significantly 
strong weapon in finance, economy, and politics. Even the change of strategy rules in 
managing reserve assets by those countries could impose a severe threat to the 
international monetary system's stability, financial markets, solvency, and thus 
functioning and growth of the entire global economy (Redo, 2017a). According to the 
IMF’s data, global foreign exchange reserves were calculated at 11.4bn USD at the 
end of 2018 and accounted for 13.3% of the world’s GDP. Nowadays, they are 8.5-
times higher than a quarter of a century ago, and 73% of all reserve assets is owned 
by only 10 countries: China, Japan, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Taiwan, US, 
Hong Kong, Korea, and India – Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Countries with the highest reserve assets at the end of 2018 nominally (in bn 
USD, left side of the table) and in relation to GDP* (right side of the table)  
  USD bn    % GDP 
1. China 3 168.2  1. Libya 176.6 
2. Japan 1 270.5  2. Hong Kong SAR, China 117.0 
3. Switzerland 787.0  3. Switzerland 111.6 
4. Saudi Arabia 509.5  4. Lebanon 92.5 
5. Russian Federation 468.6  5. Singapore 80.4 
6. Taiwan 461.8  6. Taiwan 78.4 
7. United States 449.9  7. Saudi Arabia 65.1 
8. Hong Kong SAR, China 424.6  8. Czech Republic 58.1 
9. Korea, Rep. 403.1  9. Algeria 48.4 
10. India 399.2  10. Thailand 40.7 
11. Brazil 374.7  11. Israel 31.2 
12. Singapore 292.7  12. Iraq 28.6 
13. Thailand 205.6  13. Malaysia 28.6 
14. Germany 198.0  14. Kuwait 28.4 
15. Mexico 176.4  15. Russian Federation 28.3 
16. United Kingdom 172.7  16. Peru 27.1 
17. France 166.5  17. Japan 25.6 
18. Italy 152.4  18. Korea, Rep. 24.9 
19. Czech Republic 142.5  19. United Arab Emirates 24.0 
20. Indonesia 120.7  20. Philippines 23.9 
21. Poland 117.0  21. China 23.3 
22. Israel 115.3  22. Vietnam 22.6 
23. Malaysia 101.5  23. Denmark 20.2 
24. United Arab Emirates 99.5  24. Brazil 20.1 
25. Turkey 93.0  25. Poland 20.0 
Note: * the analysis includes countries with reserve assets of more than 40 bn USD in value 
Source: Self-reported data on the basis of World Bank, 2019b (data for Taiwan: ceicdata.com) 
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This data does not show the full spectrum of the issue. The reserve assets that some 
countries have been much higher than it can be concluded based on the World Bank's 
official data. These countries have been moving some of the currency reserves to 
sovereign wealth funds (SWF) to generate those assets' higher profitability.  
 
 According to the SWF’s data, accumulated assets of 86 sovereign wealth funds are 
calculated at 8.1bn of USD (2019), and 82% of this amount is in the hands of 13 
largest SWFs who have assets of a few hundred billion USD (each of them) and 
manage over a half of global exchange reserves (6.6 USD bn from 11.4 USD bn) – 
see table 2. 
 





1. Norway Government Pension Fund Global  1 098.8 Europe Norway 
2. China Investment Corporation  940.6 Asia China 
3. Abu Dhabi Investment Authority  696.7 Middle East UAE 
4. Kuwait Investment Authority  592.0 Middle East Kuwait 
5. Hong Kong Monetary Authority Investment Portfolio 509.4 Asia Hong Kong 
6. GIC Private Limited  440.0 Asia Singapore 
7. National Council for Social Security Fund  437.9 Asia China 
8. SAFE Investment Company 417.8 Asia China 
9. Temasek Holdings 375.4 Asia Singapore 
10. Qatar Investment Authority 328.0 Middle East Qatar 
11. Public Investment Fund 320.0 Middle East Saudi Arabia 
12. Investment Corporation of Dubai 239.4 Middle East UAE 
13. Mubadala Investment Company  228.9 Middle East UAE 
 the assets of the 13 largest SWFs (USD bn) 6 624.9   
 total assets of all 86 SWFs (USD bn) 8 101.0   
 
the assets of the 13 largest SWFs in relations to total 
assets of all 86 SWFs (%) 81.8%   
Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2019. 
 
It must be noted that almost 80% of SWFs' assets are held by countries of the Asia-
Pacific and Middle East region, demonstrating the diminishing dominance of Western 
capital in the global economy. As the financial crisis of 2008 shows, sovereign wealth 
funds can be a valuable source of stability for the global economy (Urban, 2012). They 
are also a chance for the investment horizon's lengthening in the growing short-
termism in financial markets. However, the growing economic and political power of 
the states with sovereign wealth funds in the international arena has raised concerns 
about the threat that sovereign wealth funds pose to the stability of markets, 
currencies, economies, and hence to the stability and development of the global 
economy (Rozanov, 2005). These concerns are increased by the limited transparency 
of many sovereign wealth funds and the fact that some of them come from states with 
other than democratic governance systems and other approaches to the state's 
economic functions. That is why they can be the roots of the severe global financial, 
economic, or political crises in the future (Redo, 2017b). 
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4. Concentration of Assets in the Hands of Private Financial Institution  
 
 It must be noted that the assets accumulated by private financial institutions are even 
bigger. According to Standard & Poor Global’s data, the assets accumulated by 100 
major global banks are estimated at around 91tn of USD, which is 106% of global 
GDP. 26 of these institutions have assets estimated at over 1tn of USD, and the assets 
of the last bank on the list of the 100 major banks are estimated at 238bn of USD, i.e., 
40% of Poland’s GDP (Table 3). 
 





1. Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 4 027 Asia China 
2. China Construction Bank Corp. 3 377 Asia China 
3. Agricultural Bank of China 3 287 Asia China 
4. Bank of China 3 092 Asia China 
5. Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc. 2 813 Asia Japan 
6. JP Morgan Chase & Co. 2 623 America US 
7. HSBC Holdings PLC 2 558 Europe UK 
8. Bank of America Corp. 2 355 America US 
9. BNP Paribas 2 337 Europe France 
10. Crédit Agricole Group 2 124 Europe France 
 the assets of the 10 largest banks in bn of USD 28 592   
 the assets of the 10 largest banks in percent of global GDP 33.3%   
 the assets of the 100 largest banks in bn of USD 90 715   
 the assets of the 100 largest banks in percent of global GDP 105.6%   
Source: Garrido, Chaudhry, 2019. 
 
It must be noted that the assets of every major bank are comparable to Germany’s 
GDP (USD 3.9tn) or the United Kingdom’s GDP (USD 2.9tn) and are 4.8 times higher 
than the annual national income in Poland (USD 586bn, World Bank, 2019a). 
Accumulated assets of 10 major banks are calculated at USD 28.6tn and are higher 
than the USA’s GDP (USD 20.5tn) almost by half; they also constitute 1/3 of global 
GDP – Table 3. 
 
Among 100 major banks, China is in the lead with the number of its institutions – 19. 
Their assets are calculated at USD 24tn. The USA is in the 2nd place with 12 
institutions (accumulated assets of almost USD 13tn), Japan takes the 3rd place with 
8 institutions (with assets of almost USD 11tn).  
  
Table 4. Countries among 100 major global banks with the strongest representation 
(as of the end of 2018) 





% of the 100 biggest 
banks’ assets 
1. China 19  24.16 26.6% 
2. US 12  12.85 14.2% 
3. Japan 8  10.84 11.9% 
4. France 6  8.67 9.6% 
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5. UK 6  6.90 7.6% 
6. Canada 5  3.91 4.3% 
7. Spain 5  3.38 3.7% 
8. Germany 5  3.20 3.5% 
9. Australia 4  2.59 2.9% 
10. South Korea 6  2.13 2.3% 
11. Brazil 4  1.43 1.6% 
 the banks from above 11 countries 80  80.05 88.2% 
 the banks from other countries 20 10.67 11.8% 
  100  90.72  
Source: Own calculations on the basis of S&P (Garrido, Chaudhry, 2019). 
 
France (6 institutions with accumulated assets of almost USD 9tn) and the United 
Kingdom (6 institutions with accumulated assets of almost USD 7tn) also have strong 
representation.  
 
 The dynamic increase of Chinese financial institutions' assets over the last decade is 
worth noting; when it comes to assets, 4 major banks are from China, whereas in 2007, 
the list included banks from Western countries only – see Table 5 and Table 3. 
 
Table 5. The world’s biggest banks as of the end of 2007 (USD bn) 
Rank Name Total Assets Country 
1. Royal Bank of Scotland Group  3 807  United Kingdom  
2. Deutsche Bank  2 974  Germany  
3. BNP Paribas  2 494  France  
4. Barclays  2 459  United Kingdom  
5. HSBC  2 354  United Kingdom  
6. Crédit Agricole  2 268  France  
7. Citi  2 188  United States  
8. UBS  2 019  Switzerland  
9. Bank of America  1 716  United States  
10. Société Générale  1 578  France  
11. JPMorgane Chase 1 562 United States 
12. Mizuho Financial group* 1 507 Japan 
13. UniCredit 1 504 Italy 
14. ING 1 463 Netherlands 
15. Santander 1 344 Spain 
16. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ* 1 337 Japan 
17. HBOS 1 336 United Kingdom 
18. Credit Suisse Group 1 209 Switzerland 
19. Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 1 189 China 
20. Fortis 1 129 Belgium 
21. Goldman Sachs Group 1 120 United States 
22. Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group* 1 081 Japan 
23. Morgan Stanley 1 045 United States 
24. Merril Lynch 1 020 United States 
25. Commerzbank 908 Germany 
Note: * as of the end of March 2008 
Source: Global Finance, 2009. 
 
Among 50 major banks in the world (according to Global Finance), there were only 4 
institutions from China – and these four are now the biggest banks in the world when 
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it comes to their assets (see table 5 and table 3). Industrial & Commercial Bank of 
China, ranked as the 19th, was the biggest one (with assets of USD 1.189tn), and the 
3 others were ranked as 26th, 31st, and 32nd (with assets USD 903bn, 828bn and 
820bn respectively). Thus, the economic and financial potential of China must not be 
omitted, as well as India’s and many other countries from Southeast Asia; this 
potential not only comes from the dynamic growth of the region but also from its 
population, which indicates that the days of the dominance of Western capital and 
Western financial institutions are numbered. It is worth noting that 3 decades ago (in 
1988), eight major banks assets-wise (and 10 major banks deposit-wise) were found 
in Japan – Table 6. 
 
Table 6. The world’s biggest banks in 1988 (by assets and deposits, USD bn) 
Rank per 
assets 
Bank Nation Assets Deposits 
Rank per 
deposits 
1.  Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank* Japan 352.6 280.3 1. 
2.  Sumitomo Bank* Japan 334.8 265.3 2. 
3.  Fuji Bank* Japan 327.9 256.0 3. 
4.  Mitsubishi Bank* Japan 317.9 248.6 4. 
5.  Sanwa Bank* Japan 307.5 244.1 5. 
6.  Industrial Bank of Japan* ** Japan 249.6 214.4 6. 
7.  Norinchukin Bank**+ Japan 215.9 197.2 7. 
8.  Tokai Bank* Japan 213.6 170.3 9. 
9.  Credit Agricole France 210.6 143.7 18. 
10.  Citicorp U.S. 203.8 124.0 25. 
11.  Mitsubishi Trust* ++ Japan 196.3 176.2 8. 
12.  Banque Nationale France 197.0 160.5 10. 
13.  Mitsui Bank* Japan 196.2 151.1 14. 
14.  Barclays England 189.3 155.8 13. 
15.  Sumitomo Trust* ** ++ Japan 180.7 160.5 10. 
16.  Credit Lyonnais France 178.9 150.6 15. 
17.  National Westminster Bank England 178.4 144.9 17. 
18.  Mitsui Trust* ** Japan 173.2 149.8 16. 
19.  Deutsche Bank W. Germany 171.5 156.0 12. 
20.  Long-Term Credit Japan 166.9 143.1 19. 
21.  Taiyo Kobe Bank* ** ++ Japan 166.6 130.4 20. 
22.  Bank of Tokyo* Japan 162.6 128.0 21. 
23.  Yasuda Trust* ** ++ Japan 147.2 125.5 22. 
24.  Societe Generale France 145.7 124.7 24. 
25.  Daiwa Bank* ** ++ Japan 144.5 125.1 23. 
* As of March 31, 1988 ** Figures don’t include all 50%-owned subsidiaries. + As of Sept. 
30, 1988. ++ Not adjusted for all mergers and acquisitions. Source: Institutional Investor 
Source: Frantz, 1989. 
 
Among 25 of the world's biggest financial institutions, only 1 bank was from the US, 
and 17 from Japan (see Table 6). The burst of the speculative bubble in 1990 in Japan 
and the crisis that resulted from that enabled American and Western-European 
expansion in financial institutions, whereas the financial crisis of 2008 opened the 
door for Asian financial institutions.  
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 It must be noted that there are changes happening in the distribution of power in the 
world of financial markets and the financial potential of dynamically developing 
Southeast Asia; one must also keep in mind the threats coming from the concentration 
of multibillion assets in the hands of private entities and the scale of financial 
interdependence between them, asset markets, currency rates and economies in the 
times of globalization of financial markets and, most importantly, from the results of 
the possible domino effect – especially in terms of weaker, less economically stable 
developing countries with much more shallow financial markets strongly depending 
on external financial sources, much more exposed to and vulnerable to flow of capital 
and the sudden stop phenomenon (Caballero and Panageas, 2004; Caballero and 
Panageas, 2005; Cordella and Yeyati, 2005; García and Soto, 2004; Aizenman and 
Lee, 2005; Jeanne and Rancière, 2006; Aizenman and Marion, 2002; Jeanne and 
Wyplosz, 2001, Redo, 2017a).  
 
5. Additional Money Printing by Major Central Banks 
 
It must be added that the risk connected to the excessive amount of capital located on 
financial markets and its increased flow globally in search of profits will significantly 
increase in the upcoming years. This is mainly a fault of the major central banks, 
which added fuel in the last decade by printing additional money in the already 
wealthy global financial system. We are now speaking of assets with additional value 
of a few dozen trillions of dollars in central banking systems subjected to the 
multiplier effect. The program of purchasing assets for virtual printing of additional 
money called quantitative easing (QE) was (or has been) conducted by 5 central banks 
of which economies provide 52% of global GDP: Federal Reserve System (Fed, in 
the years 2014-2016 and now from October 2019), European Central Bank (ECB, in 
the years 2015-2018 and now from November 2019), Bank of Japan (BoJ, since 2010), 
Bank of England (BoE, in the years 2009-2012) and Riksbank (RB, since 2015) – 
Figure 10. 
 
As a result, there was an unprecedented increase in central bank assets of major global 
economies. BoJ’s assets increased in the years 2006-2018 by USD 4.1tn (i.e., by 
419%), ECB’s assets by USD 3.8tn (i.e., by 252%), Fed’s assets by USD 3.2tn (i.e., 
by 383%) and Riksbank’s assets by USD 76bn (i.e., by 260%). Central banks purchase 
financial instruments from banks to exchange virtually printed money, which 
improves the financial liquidity of these institutions and allows for further expansion. 
It also maintains market prices of purchased instruments at a level above that which 
would otherwise occur and, because of the scale of printing money (quantitative 
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Source: own calculations on the basis of data extracted from tradingeconomics.com (Central 
Bank Balance Sheet) and xe.com (Current and Historic Rate Tables). 
 
As a result, the prices of other financial instruments increase, which leads to the 
creation of new, bigger speculative bubbles. It is visible when it comes to prices on 
the major stock exchange, where in recent years indexes were at 2-3 times higher 
levels than in the times of bull market on global financial markets around 2007 (see 
Figure 11); it is also visible in the context of already mentioned noble metals or 
cryptocurrencies (Figure 8 and Figure 3). 
 






It is not difficult to assume that the results of the burst of a current speculative bubble 
on financial markets can be much more severe than those in 2008. Such high prices 
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confirm that the bubble will burst, but the question of when that will happen remains 
unanswered. More relevantly, one should ask if and how the world will rise from this 
event. The issue is found in the lack of ideas for the revival of the global economic 
situation and lack of tools for an economic policy due to lack of power of fiscal policy 
among even the biggest economies as a result of a significant increase in public debt 
and lack of power of monetary policy as a result of lowered interest rates to a shallow 
and even negative level in response to the crisis of 2008. As a result, economic policy 
tools lost their power and ability to revive real economic processes. It is confirmed by 
Japan’s economic stagnation, which has lasted for over 3 decades now, from which 
the discretionary economic policy could not defend itself despite having maintained 
ultra-low interest rates for the quarter of the century (around 0 percent), despite a 
significant increase in public expenditure (which led to the accumulation of the 
highest public debt among developed countries – 238% of GDP; 2018, 
tradingeconomics.com), despite the manipulation of yen’s exchange rate for the 
improvement of the export’s competitiveness (since 2001) and additional printing of 
money by BoJ (quantitative easing) for the first time in the years 2001-2006 and then 
again since 2010.  
 
 Two other central banks must be mentioned here as well – those of Switzerland and 
China, which have increased significantly over the last years. As previously 
mentioned, in the case of the Swiss central bank, it was a direct effect of intensive 
inflow of capital to Switzerland and the increased demand for CHF after the financial 
crisis of 2008. The increased interest in CHF led to the 9-time increase in SNB’s assets 
in the years 2006-2018 – from USD 92bn to USD 831bn, so for a value of USD 739bn 
– Figure 10 (and accumulation of huge exchange reserves). In China's case, the 
process of increased inflow of foreign currencies has been taking place for over a 
quarter of the century. It is connected to the accelerated economic growth of China 
and dynamic growth of export of Chinese products, which led to the accumulation of 
a significant amount of international currency reserves (mainly USD) by the Chinese 
central bank (People Bank of China – PBoC), creation of wealthy SWFs and a 
significant increase in PBoC’s assets. In the same years, 2006-2018, PBoC’s assets 
increased by almost USD 3.8tn, i.e., by 229% (Figure 10).  
 
 Aside from the risk related to multiplier effects of money from central banks, 
economies of which are responsible for 68.5% of global GDP, continuously increasing 
debt of global economy and risk related to increasing debt of less credible entities, 
increased risk tolerance, bigger and more frequent future speculative bubbles, one 
must note another obvious issue – the actual value of those international currencies as 
the significant amount of global wealth is stored in those currencies, as well as 93.8% 
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Figure 12. Structure of global exchange reserves (at the end of June 2019) 
 
Source: Self reported data on the basis of IMF, 2019. 
 
This questions the value of many other currencies worldwide, which increases the 
fluctuation risk and steep depreciation of local currencies and the sensitivity of 
economies – especially those highly dependent on external financing. One must also 
consider the scale of the problem. Figure 13 compares the number of assets of the 
above described central banks about GDP in 2006 and 2018. 
  
Figure 13. Comparison of major central banks’ assets in 2006 and 2018 (in % of GDP) 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of data extracted from tradingeconomics.com (Central 
Bank Balance Sheet, GDP) and xe.com (Current and Historic Rate Tables). 
 
The current level of assets in Switzerland and Japan's central banks is especially 
interesting (Figure 13). The assets of SNB and BoJ accounted for 101 and 118% of 
GDP respectively at the end of 2018, and in the analyzed years 2006-2018, these 
increased 5.5 times in the case of SNB and almost 5 times in the case of BoJ. The 
ECB's assets increased 3 times during that time from 13.6% of GDP of the Eurozone 
to 39.1% of GDP. In 2006, the American Fed, Swedish Riksbank, and Bank of 
England assets were relatively the lowest among the mentioned central banks. These 
accounted for 6-7% of GDP at the time. In the case of Fed and Riksbank, they are 3 
times higher and account for almost 20% of GDP, and in the case of BoE, almost 4 
times higher and account for 26.7% of GDP – Figure 13. This data confirms real 
concerns for the actual value of major international currencies and their stability in 
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the global wealth. As these currencies and assets denominated in them determine the 
value of many other currencies and assets, the above-presented data question the 
actual value of practically all global wealth. Without a doubt, the above mentioned 
major international currencies have significantly less "coverage" in GDP than 12 years 
ago. Therefore, their current market value is merely the faith of humanity, which helps 
us believe that our possessions are actually worth something.   
 
6. Summary and Concluding Comments 
 
Without a doubt, the growth and globalization of financial markets and their 
increasing wealth help accelerate global economic development. However, it must be 
noted that they pose significant risks regarding a lack of control over the financier's 
world and threats to the global economy's financial stability and the future rate of 
civilization development. More and more capital on global markets caused a 
significant decrease in its cost but, at the same time, enforced increased acceptance of 
investment risk and its underestimation, leading to its extremization – risk taking 
phenomenon. Easy access and cheap capital prompt even more debt, which raises 
concerns about the debt level globally in the next decades and risks resulting from 
such debt – the growing risk of insolvency and decreased development of most 
indebted entities, including the global economy (Redo, 2018a).  
 
Affordable and easily accessible capital lowers business entities' vigilance – both 
debtors and investors – and demotivates saving, reforms, and rationalization of actions 
among governments, banks, businesses, and citizens. This, in the case of growing debt, 
increases the risk of the sudden stop phenomenon, especially in less credible countries 
with a strong dependence on external financing. The above phenomena and risks 
connected to them are increased by the policy of ultra-low interest rates and additional 
money printing conducted by major central banks (quantitative easing), which have 
been done for over a decade now – ever since the financial crisis of 2008. It raises 
concerns over the future development of businesses and the decreased importance of 
stock markets, which have stopped mirroring businesses or countries' actual economic 
state. Such low-interest rates and QE programs discourage from share issuing and 
encourage increasing debt to finance business development – this can lead to the 
destruction of company values (Chirinko, Schaller, 2011; Jensen, 2004; Redo, 2018b).  
 
A lower number of IPO and a decreasing number of companies on stock markets can 
already be observed. Such affordable and easily accessible capital increases risk 
tolerance and enables survival for weaker entities. It thus contributes to maintaining 
ineffective solutions, prevents market clearance and more effective resource 
allocation, and limits future economic growth.  
 
Finally, the decreased power in economic policy must be pointed out as the issue of 
limited efficiency of its tools – both in the decreased power in fiscal policy (in the 
event of significant increase of public debt after the crisis of 2008 which is encouraged 
by ultra-low interest rates which have been maintained for over a decade now) and in 
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monetary policy (in the event of approaching the 0% mark). In the case of some 
countries, it is the issue of the inability of these policies. This creates rightful concerns 
whether these countries will be able to effectively deal with the negative effects of the 
growing flow of capital and how and if they will recover after probably even more 
severe crises. Although this issue concerns all countries, it is especially important in 
developing countries that heavily depend on external financing, as they are naturally 
more sensitive to shocks (Redo, 2017c). It must be stressed that also the exit from 
monetary policy stimulus by major central banks might lead to capital outflows from 
emerging economies and steep corrections in the estimation of assets, currencies, and 
cost of capital (Redo, 2017d; IMF, 2013). 
 
Inflowing capital enables economic development and debt rollover; in emerging 
economies, it also increases the probability of government insolvency, the occurrence 
of bank crises, currency crises, and inflation. It is also connected to procyclical fiscal 
policy and attempts to avoid currency appreciation, which increases the vulnerability 
and sensitivity of given economies towards the flow of capital (Reinhart, 2008). It is 
especially those countries that should, in the times of globalization of wealthy 
financial markets, maintain neutral and stabilizing (anti-cyclical) macroeconomic 
policy (sound macroeconomic policy) and start generating savings in times of 
prosperity (Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh, 2004; Redo, 2019), start strengthening the 
institutional background to increase economic resistance to shocks (Fratzscher, 2012).  
 
The research results show that the cause of many crises in developing countries can 
be found in excessive debt as a result of procyclical economic policy – see the analysis 
results in 104 countries in the years 1960-2003 conducted by Kaminsky, Reinhart, 
Végh (2004). The governments are at fault here, as they feel the rush of high public 
spending in good economic situations when capital on international markets is easily 
accessible and affordable. In times of crisis, they cut public spending to reduce the 
budget deficit, accompanied by increased market cost of capital, especially in less 
credible countries. As the research results indicate, the factors that attract capital (pull 
factors) and are connected with hard economic indicators specific for a given economy 
(macroeconomic fundamentals), state of local entities and economic policy play an 
important role; in some periods, like in the years 2009-2010, they are regarded as 
significant factors of shifting the capital from well-developed economies to emerging 
economies (Fratzscher, 2012).  
 
Finally, it must be added that, as proven by research, actual and financial openness of 
economy does not influence at all or a relatively low rate the sensitivity and 
vulnerability of economies to the flow of capital, which means that the idea of limiting 
or controlling the capital flow for the better strengthening of economic stability and 
limiting the influence of external shocks might be a completely useless tool 
Fratzscher, 2012. Thus, the only proper actions seem to be those that will permanently 
strengthen those factors that attract capital, the so-called pull factors related to the 
improvement of economic fundamentals. It must be noted that credibility, stability, 
and financial predictability and, even more broadly, economic and political 
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predictability, as well as adjustment to international standards, are necessary 
conditions (but not sufficient) to determine stable inflow of foreign investment capital, 
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